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Abstract 
The National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) real estate fund 
database was analyzed for the time period 2004-2010.  Real Estate funds were grouped 
in to three categories: core, value-add and opportunistic.  The thesis explores several 
possible determinants of fund performance during the time period which was examined.  
Ultimately, the analysis indicates that there was generally no systematic indication that 
a given fund’s characteristic(s) would portend either better or worse performance.  The 
analysis did however yield the conclusion that in general core funds displayed a 
negative correlation between returns and leverage ratio.  Finally, the thesis 
demonstrates the material difference in measured absolute and relative performance of 
opportunity funds when two different metrics are used: Time Weighted Return (TWR) 
and Internal Rate of Return (IRR). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The devastating effect of the financial crisis of 2008-09 has caused investors to 
reevaluate the methods by which they have traditionally invested in private real estate.  
Paramount in this effort is a closer study of the relative performance of closed end 
private real estate funds.   
 Which strategies have performed the best among focused and non-focused 
 funds with respect to geographic region and mix of real estate product type?  
 Do larger funds perform better relative to smaller funds?  
 How has the use of leverage influenced the return characteristics of core, value-
 added and Opportunity real estate funds? 
 What are the possible implications of relying on time weighted returns (TWR) 
 versus internal rate of return (IRR) for the determination of the best (and worst) 
 performing funds? 
 What conclusions can be drawn about fund characteristics as reliable predictors 
 of performance? 
 
In an effort to help answer these questions, this thesis will examine whether there have 
been systematic influences with respect to fund performance during the period from 
2004 through the first quarter of 2010 which may indicate either the profile and/or 
strategy of a fund which is more likely to outperform its peers during a period of time 
which encompasses both an upturn and a downturn in the market. 
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The time period from 2004 - 2010 is particularly worthy of examination given that it 
encapsulates two extremes: a torrid rise in property values followed by an historic crash. 
Table 1-1: NCREIF National Property Index Total Returns 
Year Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
 
2004 2.56% 3.13% 3.42% 4.66% 
2005 3.51% 5.34% 4.44% 5.43% 
2006 3.62% 4.01% 3.51% 4.51% 
2007 3.62% 4.59% 3.56% 3.21% 
2008 1.6% .56% -.17% -8.29% 
2009 -7.33% -5.2% -3.32% -2.11% 
2010 .76%    
Source: www.ncreif.com 
1.2 Data 
The data for this thesis has been provided by the National Council of Real Estate 
Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF).  The following description of NCREIF was taken from 
the organization’s website (http;//www.ncreif.org/about)  
NCREIF is a not-for-profit trade association that serves its membership, and the 
academic and investment community's need for improved commercial real estate data, 
performance measurement, investment analysis, information standards, education, and 
peer group interaction by: 
 Collecting, processing and reporting data in a secure environment; 
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 Producing performance measurement indices; 
 Encouraging academic and member use of NCREIF data for objective research; 
 Providing forums with strong educational content to address industry issues; 
 Publishing informed industry related articles and reports; and 
 Contributing to the development of Real Estate Information Standards. 
The data set is a compilation of the underlying funds which comprise the NCREIF 
Townsend Fund Index.  The funds are each characterized as either core, value-add 
or Opportunity vehicles.  For a full review of the current NCREIF Townsend policies, 
see Appendix A. 
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Table 1-2:  
Historical Total Returns for the NCREIF Townsend Fund Index, sorted by Core 
funds.    
Year Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
2004 2.72% 3.1% 3.32% 3.91% 
2005 4.36% 5.18% 5.02% 5.13% 
2006 3.88% 3.92% 3.63% 4.11% 
2007 3.96% 5.08% 4% 2.04% 
2008 1.34% .26% -.75% -10.75% 
2009 -13.44% -9.2% -7.3% -3.7% 
2010 1%    
Source: http://www.ncreif.com 
Table 1-3:  
Historical Total Returns for the NCREIF Townsend Fund Index, sorted by 
Value-Add funds.    
Year Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
2004 2.89% 3.52% 3.07% 7.34% 
2005 4.14% 5.54% 5.38% 10.11% 
2006 3.34% 5.17% 2.71% 7% 
2007 3.23% 6.38% 3.39% 3.37% 
2008 .33% .16% -3.04% -17.26% 
2009 -15.33% -12.6% -7.6% -13.5% 
9 
2010 -1.3%    
Source: http://www.ncreif.com 
Table 1-4:  
Historical Total Returns for the NCREIF Townsend Fund Index, sorted by 
Opportunity funds.    
Year Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
2004 4.02% 4.01% 4.86% 14.3% 
2005 5.81% 7.88% 8.77% 16.42% 
2006 4.17% 7.19% 7.85% 18.68% 
2007 8.02% 9.57% 3.85% 2.3% 
2008 -.72% -2.33% -11.13% -26.23% 
2009 -14.76% -11.3% -3.1% -4.1% 
2010 2.4%    
Source: http://www.ncreif.com 
1.3 Methodology 
This thesis will report on a quantitative analysis of a portion of the NCREIF/Townsend 
data.  Only funds that reported data continuously from the first quarter of 2004 through 
at least the fourth of quarter of 2009 were considered for the analysis.  Each of the 
qualifying funds was then examined for completeness of data for each quarter in the 
following categories: 
1.) Gross Total Return Percent (which includes Income and Appreciation) 
2.) Gross Real Estate Assets 
3.) Leverage Percentage 
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4.) Investment Style (Core, Value-Add or Opportunity) 
5.) Percentage allocation of real estate assets among the following product 
groups: 
a. Office 
b. Retail 
c. Industrial 
d. Apartment 
e. Hotel  
f. Resort 
g. Senior Living 
h. Health Care 
i. Mixed Use Specialty 
j. Residential Single Family 
k. Storage  
l. Parking 
m. Timber / Agriculture 
n. Land 
 
6.) Percentage allocation of real estate assets among the following geographic 
areas: 
a. Northeast (US) 
b. Mideast (US)  
c. Southeast (US) 
d. Southwest (US) 
e. East North Central (US) 
f. West North Central (US) 
g. Mountain (US) 
h. Pacific (US) 
i. Canada 
j. Latin America 
k. Europe 
l. Asia Pacific 
m. Other Non-US 
n. Other Regional Division 
In order to measure the degree by which a given fund was concentrated in either a 
particular product type or geographic region, I adopted the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) and applied it to each of these two categories.  The HHI is a measure of market 
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concentration.  It is calculated by squaring the percentage allocation to each product 
type (or geographic region) and then summing the result1.   
Table 1-5: 
HHI calculations for example funds 
Fund Office Multifamily Industrial HHI 
Office Experts 90% 5% 5% 0.815 
MF / Indust. Vehicle 5% 45% 50% 0.455 
Diversified Fund 30% 40% 30% 0.340 
 
For purposes of conducting the analysis, each fund’s leverage percentage was 
converted to a leverage ratio in order to more effectively analyze whether there was a 
linear relationship between fund performance and amount of leverage employed2.   
Lastly, each of the funds was sorted by Investment Style: Core, Value-Add and 
Opportunity and each analysis was conducted within a fund’s given investment style 
group. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 HHI = S1^2+S2^2+S3^2+….+Sn^2 (where Sn is the market share or percentage 
allocation to either product type or geographic region) 
2 Leverage Ratio = Loan to Value / (1-Loan to Value) 
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Chapter 2: Property Type and Geographic Region - Degree of Diversification 
 
In order to explore the relative performance of funds within each investment style, I 
analyzed the performance of funds with respect to their degree of diversification across 
property type and geographic region.  The analysis was performed in an attempt to 
answer the following question: During the time period from 2004-10, have funds which 
are concentrated in either one geographic area and/or one property type systematically 
outperformed more diversified funds?  The analysis was performed for three separate 
time periods.  1) “The run-up”, which was determined to begin in 2004 and end in 2007 
2) “The Crash”, from 2008-2010 and 3) The entire time period from 2004-2010. 
2.1 Core Funds 
 
The following scatter plots demonstrate the relationship between core funds cumulative 
total return and their HHI for both product type and region during the run up from 2004-
2007.  In total, fifteen (15) core funds were examined during this time period. 
 
13 
 
Note: The average HHI over the relevant time period was taken and then plotted versus 
cumulative total returns (see following tables). 
It is interesting to note that without the presence of the outlier fund (the laggard 
performer) the relationship between the two variables would not be nearly as strong.  In 
fact, the R-squared measure for the HHI (product) drops from 0.35 to 0.08 when the 
outlier fund is eliminated.  The R-squared for the HHI (region) drops from 0.82 to 0.11 
when the outlier is removed. 
The following scatter plots demonstrate the relationship between core funds cumulative 
total return and their HHI for both product type and region during the crash from 2008-
2010.  In total, sixteen (16) core funds were examined during this time period. 
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The relationship between HHI Product and returns is significantly diminished during the 
downturn relative to the upturn.  With respect to geographic concentration, the 
relationship is also diminished.  Interestingly, the two outlier funds (outperformers) have 
nearly opposite geographic characteristics (focused versus diversified).   
It will also be important to analyze fund performance during the entire time period 
(2004-2010) as it relates to the HHI measure of property type and geography.  The 
following tables illustrate these relationships for fifteen (15) core funds. 
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2.2 Value-Add Funds 
 
The following scatter plots demonstrate the relationship between value-add funds 
cumulative total return and their HHI for both product type and region during the run up 
from 2004-2007.  In total, twenty one (21) value-add funds were examined during this 
time period. 
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The plots above demonstrate that during this period of time there is practically no 
relationship between a fund’s performance and the degree to which it is concentrated 
among property types or geographic regions. 
The following plots illustrate this same extremely weak relationship during the down 
turn. 
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It will also be important to analyze fund performance during the entire time period 
(2004-2010) as it relates to the HHI measure of property type and geography.  The 
following tables illustrate these relationships for fifteen (15) core funds. 
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2.3 Opportunity Funds 
 
Seventy nine (79) Opportunity funds were analyzed in an attempt to discern any 
relationship between the property type and geographic concentration variables.  The 
plots below indicate that practically no relationship exists across any time frame with 
respect to property type or geographic concentration and returns. 
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Chapter 3: Fund Size – Measured by Gross Real Estate Assets 
 
This thesis set out in part to determine whether there has been any relationship 
between the size of a private real estate fund and its performance.  Do larger funds 
which have large amounts of capital to invest sacrifice performance relative to those 
funds which are smaller and can make more targeted investments?  Or, do smaller 
funds lack the capital to compete for the most attractive deals and therefore suffer as a 
result?  These questions are somewhat related to earlier research which found that the 
largest properties (in excess of $100 million) typically provide the largest return while 
also exhibiting the greatest volatility.3 
  3.1 Core Funds 
 
The analysis indicates that Core funds generally do not show a relationship between 
fund size and performance.  The following plots illustrate this relationship during the 
market bubble period from 2004-2007 for fifteen (15) core funds.  
                                                            
3 Barry Ziering and Willard McIntosh, “Property Size and Risk: Why Bigger is Not 
Always Better”, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management. Vol. 5, 1999. P105. 
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While this plot does suggest a positive correlation between fund size and total return, 
the following plot suggests the opposite relationship during the down turn from 2008-
2010. 
 
 
It is interesting to examine the influence that the two outlier (outperforming) funds have 
on this analysis.  These funds were the best performing funds with cumulative total 
returns of approximately 10% and 15% and were also the two smallest funds with 
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average gross real estate assets of approximately $253 million and $33 million 
respectively.  If these outlier funds were removed, the results of the analysis are 
fundamentally changed.  The trend line becomes essentially flat and the R-squared is 
reduced from 0.12 to 0.002. 
Ultimately, core funds do not show much of a relationship between fund size and 
performance.  The following plot shows performance relative to fund size for the entire 
period from 2004 to 2010. 
 
  3.2 Value­Add Funds 
 
Value add funds do exhibit some meaningful relationship between their size and 
performance.  Perhaps this is because value creation strategies are fewer and further in 
between and those funds with larger amounts of capital struggle to consistently find 
good investments that fit this billing. 
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The plot below shows this relationship during the period from 2004-2007.  There does 
not seem to be any relationship during this period when practically funds enjoyed a 
similar positive performance.  
 
The downturn exhibited a similar weak relationship. 
 
It is not until the entire time period is examined that a modest negative relationship 
between fund size and performance emerges.  The following plot illustrates this.  
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  3.3 Opportunity Funds 
 
Opportunity funds were found to exhibit no real relationship between fund size and 
performance.  One might expect that these funds would share similar characteristics 
with respect to size and performance as value add funds.  Particularly, if one is to 
believe the idea that well performing yet riskier investments are harder to come by and 
therefore those funds with more capital might struggle to consistently place their capital 
with these sorts of opportunities.  However, we cannot draw this conclusion based on 
the following quantitative analysis which is illustrated in the scatter plots. 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Chapter 4: The Influence of leverage on fund returns 
 
 
The use of leverage to execute real estate investments is rather pervasive among 
private real estate funds. The implications are obvious: the potential for enhanced total 
returns along with the increase in risk and volatility that accompany it.  But how has the 
use of leverage impacted the core, value-add and opportunity fund space?  Have some 
fund types been more successful at utilizing leverage than others?  Are the results 
similar for the bubble and the subsequent crash?  The following scatter plots will help to 
illustrate some answers to these questions.   
4.1 Core Funds 
 
Core funds exhibit a fairly strong correlation with respect to returns and leverage ratio 
even though the amount of leverage they employ is rather small relative to value-add 
and opportunity funds.  The following scatter plot illustrates this relationship for 2004-
2007.  
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While the relationship is fairly weak during the upturn, this is not the case during the 
downturn.  Clearly, a stronger pattern is exhibited on the way down: more leverage, 
worse returns.  It is apparent that while core funds did not necessarily garner much 
benefit from additional leverage on the way up, they surely felt the harsh effects of the 
added risk on the way down. 
 
And finally, the analysis of this relationship during the entire time period of 2004-2010 
shows that even though returns were generally positive during this time period, those 
funds which utilized more leverage tended to underperform. 
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4.2 Value­Add Funds 
 
Value-Add funds share similar characteristics as core funds with respect to returns and 
leverage.  However, the relationship does not appear to be as strong.  On the way up, 
those funds with more leverage generally benefited as illustrated below. 
 
Similarly, on the way down – funds with the worst performance tended to have more 
leverage. 
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The analysis which encompasses the entire time period from 2004 to 2010 does show a 
negative relationship between leverage ratio and overall returns but it is not overly 
compelling.  Additionally, the slope of the trend line is undoubtedly rather influenced by 
each of the outlier funds which have a -100% IRR (i.e. the cumulative outlay of 
cash/losses was larger than the initial outlay itself).  
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4.3 Opportunity Funds 
 
Opportunity funds display the expected characteristics with respect to the amount of 
leverage which they employ (on average higher than the other funds) but do not show a 
strong relationship between overall returns and the amount of leverage in any of the 
time periods which are examined.  Interestingly, we do not see the same negative 
relationship between returns and leverage ratio for the time period 2004-10 with 
opportunity funds. 
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Chapter 5: IRR versus Time Weighted Return – Opportunity Funds 
 
In the White Paper, “Real Estate Opportunity Funds: Déjà Vu All Over Again” by 
Pension Consulting Alliance, Inc., the authors elevated the potential pitfalls of evaluating 
opportunity fund performance by using the Time Weighted Return Metric (TWR) in lieu 
of an Internal Rate of Return (IRR).  “If small dollar amounts are involved in terms of 
contributions and distributions in the early quarters of the partnership, the TWR metric 
disproportionately reflects the impact of those quarters in the since-inception 
returns….TWR’s do not pay benefits to beneficiaries, IRRs do”4.  Moreover, gains or 
losses when small dollar amounts are involved at any point of a fund could potentially 
distort the performance of a fund as well as its relative performance among its peers5.  
The following table and example illustrate the material variance in overall ranking that 
exists when examining NCREIF Opportunity funds during the time period 2004-10.6  
The importance of this topic should be readily apparent as the fund which ranks first out 
of fifteen (highest) in TWR during the period 2004-2010 is actually the twelfth ranked 
fund in terms of IRR over the same period.   
                                                            
4 Pension Consulting Alliance, Inc. White Paper: Real Estate Opportunity Funds: Déjà 
Vu All Over Again.  May 2003 
5 Time Weighted Return measure is also referred to as the “geometric mean return” and 
does not weight the actual fund cash flows as an Internal Rate of Return would. 
6 Note that each fund’s “since inception” IRR has been estimated by counting the 1st 
Quarter 2004 TWR Denominator as the initial, “Time Zero” Investment. 
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Table of top Fifteen Opportunity Fund Annual Total Return (TWR) and IRRs 2004-
2010 
TWR Rank TWR IRR Rank IRR 
1 104.2% 12 18.7% 
2 63.7% 14 12.7% 
3 52.9% 3 49.2% 
4 46.0% 2 55.6% 
5 45.0% 1 73.7% 
6 39.0% 10 20.7% 
7 27.8% 4 38.7% 
8 25.8% 6 32.9% 
9 25.7% 9 21.3% 
10 23.7% 5 35.1% 
11 22.7% 15 12.1% 
12 22.6% 13 13.5% 
13 22.6% 11 18.9% 
14 22.3% 8 25.6% 
15 21.0% 7 30.6% 
Arithmetic Mean 37.7%  30.6% 
Min 21.0%  12.1% 
Max 104.2%  73.7% 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This thesis set out in part to answer the following two questions: 
 Which strategies have performed the best among focused and non-focused 
 funds with respect to geographic region and mix of real estate product type?  
 Do larger funds perform better relative to smaller funds?  
Based on the data set which was provided by NCREIF and the analysis described 
herein, there does not appear to be systematic determinants of real estate fund 
performance in respect of each of the factors listed above.  We have seen that there is 
generally no meaningful relationship between most of the variables which were 
examined and each of the three real estate fund types.  Therefore, what are some of the 
determining factors of fund performance?  Clearly, macroeconomic conditions and 
capital markets sentiment must have played a major role on both the way up and the 
way down.  But what about other factors, namely the amount of leverage which a given 
fund employed? 
This thesis also set out to answer the following question: 
 How has the use of leverage influenced the return characteristics of core, value-
 added and Opportunity real estate funds? 
In this area, the analysis yielded some more concrete results which indicated that Core 
funds experienced a fairly strong relationship between the amount of leverage they 
employed and their overall returns.  Most interestingly, even though Core funds used 
the least amount of leverage and returns were generally positive for the time period 
2004-2010, we saw a negative correlation between the amount of leverage a fund 
36 
employed and its reported returns.  This findings suggests that Core funds may not 
have been particularly adept at utilizing debt financing to capitalize their real estate 
investments. In fact, while the other fund categories did not show as strong a 
relationship in this area, we can still say that systematically, Core fund returns were 
diminished as the amount of leverage utilized increased.   
Lastly, this thesis endeavored to explore the impact of the different return metrics which 
are employed in the fund industry, namely with opportunity funds.  As the table of the 
top fifteen (15) opportunity funds ranked by TWR indicated, there can be a very material 
difference in both the absolute returns of a given fund and more importantly, its relative 
ranking among other funds within its peer group.  While others have demonstrated the 
importance of this point in concept, this thesis was able to demonstrate this issue using 
actual fund data.  The results were rather striking given that the highest ranked fund by 
TWR was in fact the twelfth (of fifteen) ranked fund by economic IRR. 
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